Phasing out Russian natural gas imports and improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies

Amendments tabled for the plenary sitting on this text, in their own numbering series. This is a different set from the committee amendments tracked elsewhere on AmendEU, and is not counted in any of the site’s amendment totals.

1. Amendment 1AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT* · to the Commission proposal · 2025/0180 (COD) · Proposal for a · REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL · on phasing out Russian natural gas and oil imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 · THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, · Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 194(2) and 207 thereof, · Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, · After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, · Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, · Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions, · Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, · Whereas: · (1) The unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 revealed the dramatic consequences of the existing dependencies on Russian natural gas on markets and security. In their Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022, Heads of States therefore agreed to gradually decrease and eventually fully remove the dependency on Russian energy. The REPowerEU Communication of 8 March 2022 and the REPowerEU Plan of 18 May 2022 proposed concrete measures to allow the full diversification away from Russian energy imports in a safe, affordable and sustainable manner. Significant progress in the process to diversify gas supplies away from Russia was achieved since then. As the remaining volumes of Russian natural gas entering the Union are still significant, the Commission announced in its REPower Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports of 6 May 2025 a legislative proposal to fully phase out Russian gas imports and to improve the existing framework for energy dependencies. In order to achieve full independence from Russian energy imports, it is equally urgent to phase-out Russian nuclear energy imports, in line with the REPowerEU Plan. · (2) Multiple examples of unannounced and unjustified supply reductions and interruptions already before the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, and the weaponisation of energy by the Russian Federation since then, show that the Russian Federation systematically used existing dependencies on Russian gas supplies as a political weapon to harm the Union’s economy. This leads to serious negative effects on Member States single market stability, the Union’s consumers, and the Union’s economic security and competitiveness in general. The Russian Federation and its energy companies can therefore no longer be considered reliable energy trading partners by the Union. · (3) In January 2006, Russia stopped its natural gas supplies to Bulgaria and other countries in South East Europe in the middle of a cold spell, driving up prices increases and causing or threatening harm to citizens. On 6 January 2009, Russia again fully cut off gas transiting through Ukraine, affecting 18 Member States, especially those in Central and Eastern Europe. The supply disruption led to serious disturbances of gas markets in the region and the whole of the Union. Some Member States had zero natural gas flows for nearly 14 days, forcing lasting shutdowns of heating in schools and factories, and requiring them to declare the state of emergency. In 2014, the Russian Federation invaded and illegally annexed Crimea, ceased Ukrainian gas production assets in Crimea and reduced gas supplies to several Member States which had announced to supply Ukraine with gas, leading to market disturbances and price increases and harming economic security. In the past, Russia’s State-controlled monopoly exporter Gazprom has been the subject to several Commission investigations for a possible breach of the EU competition rules and has subsequently modified its conduct on the market to address the Commission’s competition concerns. ▌The competition issues at stake concerned, in several cases, so-called ‘territorial restrictions’ in Gazprom’s gas supply contracts, prohibiting the resale of gas outside the own country, as well as evidence that Gazprom was engaged in unfair pricing practices and made energy supplies dependent on political concessions from participation in Russian pipeline projects or acquiring control over Union energy assets. · (4) Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war against Ukraine since February 2022 and subsequent weaponised reductions of gas supplies in conjunction with the manipulation of the markets through intentional disruptions of gas flows have laid bare vulnerabilities and dependencies in the Union and its Member States, with the clear potential of a direct and serious impact on the functioning of the Union gas market, the Union’s economy and its essential security interests, as well as direct harm to Union citizens because energy supply disruptions can harm citizens’ health or life. Evidence shows that the State-controlled company Gazprom intentionally manipulated the Union’s energy markets in order to drive up energy prices. Large underground storages in the Union controlled by Gazprom were left at an unprecedentedly low level, and Russian companies reduced sales at Union gas hubs and fully discontinued the use of their own sales platform before the invasion, affecting short-term markets and aggravating the already tight supply situation after Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine. As of March 2022, Russia systematically halted or reduced deliveries of natural gas to Member States, leading to significant disturbances on the Union gas market. This affected notably the supplies to the Union via the Yamal pipeline, the supplies to Finland as well as the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, where Gazprom first reduced flows and eventually shut supplies via the pipeline entirely. · (5) Russia’s weaponisation of gas supply and market manipulation through intentional disruptions of gas flows led to skyrocketing energy prices in the Union, reaching unprecedented levels, up to eight times above the average of previous years, in 2022. The resulting need to find alternative gas supply sources, to change supply routes, to fill storages for the winter, and to find solutions for congestion problems in the Union’s gas infrastructure contributed to high price volatility and the unprecedented price hikes in 2022. · (6) The exceptionally high gas prices translated into high electricity prices and price increases for other energy products, leading to sustained high inflation. A deep economic crisis with negative growth rates in many Member States, caused by the high energy prices and volatility, endangered the economy of the Union, undermined consumer purchasing power and raised the cost of manufacturing, particularly in energy, leading to risks for social cohesion and stability, and even to human life or health. The supply interruptions also led to very seriously problems for the security of energy supply in the Union and forced eleven Member States to declare an energy crisis level under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Benefitting from the Union’s dependency during that crisis, Russia’s manipulations of the market allowed it to achieve record-high profits from remaining energy trade with Europe, with revenues from gas imports accounting still for EUR 15bn in 2024. Those revenues could be used to finance further economic attacks against the Union, undermining economic security. They could also be used to finance the war of aggression against the Ukraine which constitutes a major threat to political and economic stability in Europe. · (7) The recent crisis provided evidence that trustful trade relations with partners supplying energy products are crucial to preserve market stability, to protect human life and health as well as the essential security interests of the Union, not the least because the Union depends to a large extent on energy imports from third countries. Maintaining energy supplies from Russia would expose the Union to continued economic and security risks; it would therefore not increase but decrease its supply security. Even dependencies on smaller import volumes of Russian gas can, if abused by Russia, significantly distort the price dynamic, even if just temporarily, and disrupt energy markets, especially in those regions which are still significantly reliant on imports from Russia. Taking into account the long standing and consistent pattern of market manipulations and supply disruptions, and the fact that the Russian government has consistently used gas trade as a weapon to achieve policy instead of trade goals, it is therefore appropriate to take legally binding measures to eliminate all remaining vulnerabilities of the Union resulting from natural gas imports both via pipelines and liquified natural gas (LNG) with the Russian Federation. · (7a) In their Versailles Declaration, the Heads of Member States committed not only to phase out natural gas supplies from Russia, but also other energy supplies, notably oil supplies. Russia has a history of using oil as a means of exerting coercion and manipulation. For example, in July 2006, Russia’s oil pipeline monopoly, Transneft, permanently halted deliveries, citing alleged technical reasons, to Lithuania’s Mazeikiai refinery, the largest economic entity in the country, and the only refinery in the Baltic states. This move appeared to be a response to the Polish company PKN Orlen acquiring a majority stake in the refinery, instead of Russian firms Lukoil or Rosneft. In addition, in April 2019, amidst deteriorating relations between Russia and Belarus, mounting Russian economic pressure on Ukraine, and growing tensions with several Central European countries, the chloride contamination of 5 million tonnes of Russian oil transported through the “Druzhba” pipeline caused severe disruption. The incident caused significant damage to the Mozyr refinery in Belarus, led to the suspension of deliveries to Poland and Ukraine, and forced the shutdown of refineries in Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which lasted many weeks. It is also imperative to close loopholes that allow the indirect import of Russian oil in the form of refined products, such as gasoline, via third countries. For example, certain countries have emerged as major exporters of refined oil products to the European Union, largely due to a significant increase in their imports of discounted Russian crude for processing in their refineries. · (7b) In order to prevent Russia from continuing to use the Union’s oil imports as a tool for coercion and to cease further disruption to the internal market arising from such coercion, it is essential to complement existing measures with a permanent prohibition of oil imports from the Russian Federation from 1 January 2026. These measures should also include a ban on the import of refined oil products derived from crude oil of Russian origin. While the impact on the internal market is expected to be stabilising, the impact on prices is expected to be minimal. As crude oil is traded globally, the additional seaborne supply needed to replace Druzhba pipeline volumes (about 11.4 mt/year) represents only 0.5% of global seaborne trade, an amount that is unlikely to affect prices significantly. Czechia’s shift from Russian to seaborne crude in April 2025 (approx. 4.3 mt/year) had no noticeable effect on international prices. While oil imports have decreased significantly, a further phase out of Russian oil is fully feasible for countries who are still supplying Russian oil, but may require specific preparatory steps and coordination with neighbouring countries. Member States should therefore prepare national diversification plans also for oil, with a possibility for the Commission to adopt decisions on those plans. · (8) The restrictions on international transactions provided for in ▌of this Regulation are consistent with the Union’s external action in other areas, as required by Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The state of relations between the Union and the Russian Federation has greatly deteriorated in recent years and particularly since 2022. That deterioration of relations is due to the Russian Federation’s blatant disregard for international law and, in particular, its unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. Since July 2014, the Union has progressively imposed restrictive measures on trade with the Russian Federation in response to the Russian Federation’s actions against Ukraine. The Union is allowed, by virtue of the exceptions that apply under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and in particular Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (security exceptions) and analogous exceptions under the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the Russian Federation, not to accord to goods imported from the Russian Federation the advantages granted to like products imported from other countries (most-favoured-nation treatment). Therefore, the Union is not prevented from imposing prohibitions or restrictions on the import of goods of the territory of the Russian Federation, if the Union considers such measures, taken in time of the existing emergency in international relations between the Union and the Russian Federation, to be necessary for the protection of the Union’s essential security interests. · (8a) In order to safeguard the Union’s security of gas supply and prevent circumvention of the prohibition on the import of Russian natural gas, the scope of that prohibition should also extend to the temporary storage of Russian origin gas in the EU storage facilities located on the territory of the Union. The Union’s gas storage facilities are critical security assets, covering some 30% of winter consumption across the Union. Well-filled storage facilities, along with voluntary demand reduction, have proven essential in periods of tight supply and market stress. Past instances of gas storage hoarding have further led to substantial market distortions, increased prices, and threats to critical security measures. Allowing third-country entities to book capacity to temporarily store Russian origin gas in the Union for later withdrawal or re-export undermines the Union’s objective to phase out dependency on Russian fossil fuels and uses up capacity needed for ensuring the Union’s energy security. For the purposes of achieving the goals of this Regulation, temporary storage of Russian gas should therefore be prohibited. · (9) Diversifying LNG import capacity is essential for strengthening and maintaining energy security within the Union. A significant portion of that capacity is controlled by Russian companies via long-term contracts of more than 10 years, creating a risk that the capacity rights reserved in those contracts could be used to obstruct imports from alternative sources through capacity hoarding practices. Similar practices could make Union energy markets subject to the prolonged influence of Russian companies, which have previously demonstrated a significant capacity to distort markets in the Union, using existing dependencies. ▌Given the essential role that LNG is expected to play in securing alternative energy supplies ▌it is essential to complement the gas import ban with a prohibition on providing LNG terminal services to Russian entities. To assist Member States in ending their dependency on Russian gas supplies, and to ensure the effective delivery of LNG imports from alternative sources, it is important to prevent Russian customers of LNG terminal services from blocking the necessary import infrastructure▌. The provision of long-term LNG terminal services to entities from Russia or to entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly via various frameworks, such as intermediate structures or subsidiaries, by Russian Federation, or under significant influence from the Russian Federation should be therefore prohibited as of 1 January 2026. Those provided under a contract concluded before 17 June 2025, should be prohibited as of 1 January 2027. This should enable the reallocation of terminal capacity to alternative LNG suppliers and strengthen the resilience of the energy market in the Union. · (10) The Commission has carefully assessed the impact on the Union and on its Member States of a possible prohibition of Russian imports of natural gas and of the provision of LNG terminal services to Russian entities. In fact, preparatory work and several detailed analyses of the consequences of a total phase out of Russian gas have been conducted and published since 2022, and the Commission could also draw upon a multitude of consultations with stakeholders, external experts and agencies, and studies on the effects of the phase out of Russian gas. The Commission’s analysis showed that a phase out of Russian natural gas imports, if introduced in a stepwise, coordinated and well-prepared manner in a spirit of solidarity, is likely to have limited impact on energy prices in the Union, and that it will enhance and not endanger the Union’s security of supply, due to the exit of an unreliable trading partner from the Union markets. As set out in the REPower Roadmap, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already reduced supply dependencies from Russia, for instance by measures to reduce gas demand or to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources, as well as active support to diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the EU bargaining power via Joint gas purchasing. The Assessment of Impact also showed that upfront coordination of diversification policies can avoid harmful effects on prices or supplies. Moreover, the global LNG supply is growing rapidly, while gas demand in the Union is in steady decline. Since 2021, gas consumption in the Union has dropped by 80 bcm/y and it is now down by 17% on average, compared to the period before February 2022. As the projected reduction in consumption by 2027 is larger than the current imports from Russia, only a small part of the Russian gas imports would need to be replaced with alternative suppliers. Therefore, setting 1 January 2027 as the end date for Russian gas imports is both feasible and well-timed. · (11) The proposed Regulation is fully compatible with the Union’s strategy to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels imports by enhancing decarbonisation and rapidly expanding domestically produced clean energy. As set out in the REPower Roadmap, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already resulted in substantial gas savings of more than 60 billion cubic meters annually in gas imports between 2022 and 2024, allowing the Union to reduce supply dependencies from Russia. This could be achieved by measures to reduce gas demand, to increase energy efficiency or to accelerate the green transition by an accelerated deployment of wind and solar generation capacity, which significantly increased the share of renewables in the energy mix, as well as by active support to diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the EU bargaining power via joint gas purchasing. Moreover, the full implementation of the energy transition, the recent Action Plan for Affordable Energy and other measures, notably investments in the production of low-carbon alternatives for energy intensive products, such as fertilisers, are expected to replace up to 100 bcm of natural gas by 2030. These combined efforts will strengthen the Union’s resilience, competitiveness, and open strategic autonomy, support European industries, SMEs and citizens facilitate the phase out of gas imports from the Russian Federation. · (12) In line with the Versailles Declaration and the REPowerEU Communication, a large number of gas importers have already terminated or significantly reduced their gas supplies from Russia. As set out in the Assessment of Impacts, the remaining gas volumes under existing supply contracts can, be phased out without significant economic impact or risks for security of supply, due to the availability of sufficient alternative suppliers on the gas world market, a well-interconnected Union gas market and the availability of sufficient import infrastructure. The related measures need to be in line with the current energy framework of the Union. · (13) Short-term contracts, that is contracts on individual or multiple natural gas supplies of a duration of less than one year, concern smaller volumes than the large multi-year supply contracts importers hold with Russian companies. These existing contracts will in any event be close to expiration when this Regulation will enter into force. Accordingly, the risk for economic security resulting from existing short term-contracts appears to be low. It is therefore appropriate to exempt existing short-term contracts from the immediate application of the import allowing for a transition phase until 17 June 2026. · (14) An exemption from the prohibition of gas imports as of 1 January 2026 should also be granted for existing long term supply contracts. Indeed, importers holding long-term contracts will usually need more time to find alternative supply routes and sources than short-term contract holders, also as long-term contracts usually concern significantly larger volumes over time than short-term contracts. A transition time should therefore be introduced to give holders of long-term contracts sufficient time to diversify their supplies in an orderly manner. A legal prohibition of imports of natural gas under a Union trade measure constitutes ‘force majeure’, a sovereign act of the Union beyond the control of gas importers, rendering the performance of natural gas imports from Russia unlawful, with direct legal effect and without any discretion for Member States concerning its application. The Commission should provide information and technical assistance to EU companies, including through best practices and training sessions, to facilitate the effective implementation of the Regulation. · ▌ · (16) While it appears justified to exempt existing “legacy” contracts from the immediate application, not all contracts entered into before the entry into force of this Regulation should benefit from such exemption. Indeed, there may be an incentive by Russian suppliers to use the time between the publication of this proposal until the entry into force of the ban to increase current supplies, by concluding new contracts, increasing volumes by changing existing contracts or using flexibilities under existing contracts. In order to ensure that imports from Russia do not increase but decrease as a result of the proposed Regulation, measures should be included in the Regulation to avoid a “rush” for new Russian gas imports in the time between the adoption of this proposal and the entry into force of the ban. Indeed, the commitment from Heads of State to phase out gas supplies was already made in March 2022; it was renewed in the REPowerEU Strategy, the REPowerEU Plan and the REPowerEU Roadmap. At the latest with the publication of the proposal for this Regulation, it is no longer appropriate consider contracts concluded after that date as “legacy” contracts. Contracts concluded after 17 June 2025 should therefore not benefit from the exceptional transition provisions for existing short and long-term contracts. · (17) In order to avoid that import volumes provided for in existing supply contracts are increased and not decreased, amendments to existing supply contracts should be considered as new contracts for the purposes of this Regulation, and increases of import volumes by using contractual flexibilities should not benefit from the transition period. · (18) This Regulation creates a clear legal prohibition to import and temporarily store Russian natural gas and oil, including petroleum products, constituting a sovereign act of the Union beyond the control of respective importers and rendering the performance of natural gas and oil, including petroleum products, imports from Russia and the temporary storage unlawful, with direct legal effect and without any discretion for Member States concerning its application. · (19) Unlike other goods, natural gas is a homogeneous commodity which is traded in large volumes and often resold multiple times between traders at wholesale level. Taking into account the particular complexity of tracing the country of production of natural gas, and bearing in mind that Russian suppliers might seek to circumvent this Regulation, for example by sales via intermediaries, via transshipments or transport through other countries, this Regulation should provide for an effective framework to establish the actual origin and the point of export of natural gas imported into the Union. · (20) In particular, importers of natural gas, and/or natural gas undertakings planning to temporarily store, should be obliged to provide customs authorities with all information necessary to establish the country of production and the point of export of natural gas imported into the Union and to decide whether the imported gas falls under the general prohibition or one of its exceptions. The concept of country of production allows customs authorities to determine the origin of the imported gas which remains the country of extraction even if the natural gas is liquified or regasified in another country. As the contractual conditions determining the elements relevant for the assessment of the customs authorities are often complex, customs authorities should be given the power to ask importers for detailed contract information, including entire supply contracts, excluding price information, where this is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other contractual provisions. However, the level of information required should depend on the origin of the natural gas and be based on the risk of circumvention. For gas originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, a prior authorisation from customs authorities should be required and to this end, importers should submit detailed evidence, such as evidence related to delivery points, quantities, information on liquefaction and loading ports. For gas originating in countries other than the Russian Federation, importers should provide evidence to establish the country of production. The Commission should determine the minimum standards for such evidence, including the type, format and authentication requirements, in order to ensure uniform application across Member States. No prior authorisation or evidence should be required for imports from countries prohibiting Russian gas imports, in a manner equivalent to the obligations laid down in this Regulation, and the Commission should establish a list of such countries. The Regulation should include rules to ensure an effective protection of business secrets of concerned undertakings. · (20a) Importers of oil, including petroleum products, should be required to submit to the customs authorities an application for prior authorisation of imports accompanied by all information necessary to establish the country of origin of the imported crude oil, the country of origin of the imported petroleum product or the country of origin of crude oil on the basis of which the petroleum product was obtained. The Commission should determine the minimum standards for such evidence, including the type, format and authentication requirements, in order to ensure uniform application across Member States. The Regulation should also establish obligations for oil pipeline operators, regarding the verification of origin. A requirement to verify and certify the origin of oil at the point of entry will provide an essential safeguard against the unauthorised import of restricted commodities and will complement existing import controls. · (20b) In order to establish the minimum standards for evidence which importers need to present to customs authorities to prove the origin of natural gas, oil and petroleum products, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. The Commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts where, in duly justified cases relating to the significant risks for trade and security stemming from possible circumvention of this Regulation, imperative grounds of urgency so require. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council. · (21) Customs authorities should cooperate with regulatory authorities, competent authorities, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the Commission to implement the provisions of this Regulation and exchange relevant information, notably when it comes to the assessment of exemptions allowing imports of Russian natural gas after 1.1.2026. Customs authorities, regulatory authorities, competent authorities and ACER should have the necessary tools and databases in place to ensure that relevant information can be exchanged between national authorities and authorities in different Member States where necessary. Customs authorities and relevant authorities should access, use and exchange the relevant information gathered pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 ("Methane Regulation"), in particular data related to gas supply chain traceability, to support the detection and prevention of circumvention. Member States should ensure that customs authorities and other relevant authorities have adequate powers, functional independence, and the capabilities to fulfil the obligations set out in this Regulation. ACER should contribute with its expertise to the process of monitoring the implementation. To facilitate the creation of the necessary interoperable joint information systems, the Commission and Member States may explore possibilities to make use of budget under the Internal Security Fund (ISF). Customs authorities should notify regulatory authorities, the national competent authority and the Commission on a monthly basis regarding key elements concerning the development of imports of Russian gas (such as quantities imported under long-term or short-term contracts, entry points, or contract partners). Where the Commission has doubts as to the effectiveness of monitoring at the Member State level, the Commission should request the necessary information from customs authorities and other relevant authorities. · (21a) There is increasing evidence that certain suppliers may resort to opaque maritime transport practices, including the use of so-called dark or shadow fleets that disable tracking systems, reflag vessels or conduct ship-to-ship transfers to obscure the origin, ownership and destination of energy shipments. Although such practices have been predominantly observed in oil transport, they could also pose risks for LNG imports, undermining the objectives of this Regulation. It is therefore necessary that Member States monitor maritime transport practices in their territorial waters, including by requesting any relevant documentation. · (21b) The Union has created a robust legal framework to ensure security of gas supply at all times, and to deal with possible supply crises in a coordinated manner, including obligations on Member States to provide for effective and operational solidarity to neighbours in need of gas. The Commission should constantly monitor the development of market risks for gas supply resulting from gas trade with Russia at Union, regional and Member State level. To avoid indirect circumvention of the prohibitions set out in this Regulation, the Commission should also constantly monitor the flows of Russian natural gas transiting through third countries, particularly Türkiye and Azerbaijan and carry out a risk-based analysis of LNG terminals to identify those for which there are reasonable grounds to suspect imports of Russian natural gas. The Commission should establish a list of such terminals, and could propose appropriate measures, including legislative proposals, to mitigate identified risks. The Commission should also publish an annual report on natural gas flows from third countries, including an assessment of risks of circumvention. · (21c) The petrochemical industry is closely linked to the oil and gas industry, as its feedstocks are derived directly from oil refining and natural gas processing. To prevent circumvention of the ban on Russian crude oil and petroleum products, it is essential to closely monitor imports of petrochemical products CN Code 39 obtained in third countries from Russian crude oil. Failure to address these imports could risk the effectiveness of this Regulation. The Commission should therefore assess their impact and, where disruptions are confirmed, take appropriate measures, which may include a legislative proposal. · (22) Russia is a major gas exporter and has not played any noticeable role as gas transit country in the past. This is due to several factors, such as the lack of regasification infrastructure, the organisation of gas trade in Russia via a pipeline export monopoly, business models of Russian gas companies which are not based on organising transits, or Russia’s geographical location. Therefore, imports of natural gas arriving via interconnection points between the Russian Federation and the Union are usually originating in, or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation. The same consideration applies to gas imported via interconnection points between the Union and Serbia, as Serbia can, for technical reasons, only export gas of Russian origin towards the Union. In order to ensure that the measures to prevent the import of gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation are kept up to date, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission to amend the list of interconnection points where gas is presumed to be exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making*. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council should receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. · (23) Experience with the announced phase out of gas supplies via Ukraine has shown that good preparation and coordination in a spirit of solidarity can effectively avoid market disruptions or security of supply problems potentially resulting from changing gas suppliers. To prepare for the full phase out of Russian gas in 2027 in a coordinated manner and to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes involved without risk for security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy prices, Member States should prepare national diversification plans and present them by 1 March 2026. Those plans should describe intended measures at national or regional level to reduce demand, foster renewable energy production and ensure alternative supplies, as well as possible technical or regulatory barriers which may complicate the diversification process, and measures to ensure full transparency and actual control preventing possible circumvention. As the diversification process may require coordination of measures at national, regional or Union level, the Commission should assess the national diversification plans, with the possibility to issue decisions to adapt those plans where necessary. · ▌ · (25) Experience during the gas crisis of 2022 and 2023 has shown ▌that comprehensive information on the supply situation and possible supply dependencies is crucial to monitor gas supply in the Union. Therefore importers of Russian gas making use of the exemptions laid down in this Regulation should submit to the Commission all information which is necessary to effectively evaluate possible risks for gas trade. That information should include key parameters, or even whole text parts, of the relevant gas supply contracts, excluding price information, where this is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other provisions in the contract. When monitoring gas supply in the Union, the Commission should also take into account information on imports provided by customs authorities and information included in national diversification plans. The Commission should regularly inform the Gas Coordination Group established by Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 about the phase-out process at the Union level and submit an annual report on the Russian gas phase-out, which may be accompanied by specific Union recommendations and actions to accelerate the phase-out process. · (26) Member States and Union should cooperate closely in the implementation of this Regulation. With a view to the recent practice of the Russian Federation to unilaterally change agreed court and arbitration procedures in a manner not compatible with international customary law or bilateral investment treaties entered between Member States and Russia, it follows from international law that affected companies and Member States cannot be held liable for any judgments, arbitral awards, including investor-State arbitral awards, or other judicial decisions adopted under procedures which are illegal under international customary law or under a bilateral investment treaty, and against which the person or Member State concerned does not have effective access to the remedies under the relevant jurisdiction. With respect to financial responsibilities concerning possible investor-to-state dispute settlement resolution cases, reference is made, to Regulation (EU) 912/2014, where applicable. · ▌ · (27a) To ensure compliance with this Regulation, Member States should establish penalties that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. These penalties should take into account the seriousness and duration of the infringement, any advantages gained, cooperation with authorities, past conduct, and other relevant circumstances. A harmonised provision of penalties, when applying administrative fines, should be introduced, to ensure consistent application of this Regulation across the Member States. By one month from the entry into force of this Regulation, Member States should inform the Commission of the penalty rules they adopt and of any later changes without undue delay. · (28) The proposed measures fully reflect the principle of energy solidarity. Indeed, the level of exposure to Russian gas imports differs between Member States, and many Member States have already taken measures to phase out Russian gas. The proposal for this Regulation will ensure an EU-wide harmonised approach to the phase out of Russian gas, preserving solidarity between Member States. · (29) Since the objectives of this Regulation relating to the monitoring of possible gas dependencies cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States in a coordinated manner and without risk of market fragmentation, but can be better and more efficiently achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. · (30) In view of the importance for the Union to phase out further economic dependence of the Union on gas imports from the Russian Federation without any delay, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, · HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: · CHAPTER I · GENERAL PROVISIONS · Article 1 · Subject matter · This Regulation provides a framework for effectively eliminating the Union’s remaining exposure to the significant risks for trade and security, resulting from gas and oil trade with the Russian Federation by laying down: · (a) a stepwise prohibition of imports and temporary storage of natural gas from the Russian Federation and of the provision of LNG terminal services; · (aa) a prohibition of oil imports, including petroleum product imports, from the Russian Federation; · (b) rules to effectively implement and monitor those prohibitions; · (c) provisions to better assess the security of energy supplies in the Union. · Article 2 · Definitions · For the purpose of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply: · (1) ‘natural gas’ means natural gas as defined in Article 2, point (1), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council and as referred to in Combined Nomenclature (CN) codes 2711 11 00 and 2711 21 00; · (2) ‘LNG’ means liquefied natural gas as referred to in CN code 2711 11 00; · (3) ‘natural gas in gaseous state’ means natural gas as referred to in CN code 2711 21 00; · (4) ‘long-term supply contract’ means a contract for the supply of natural gas, excluding a natural gas derivative, exceeding one year; · (5) ‘short-term supply contract’ means a contract for the supply of natural gas, excluding a natural gas derivative, not exceeding one year; · ▌ · (7) ‘importer’ means a natural or legal person who has the power to determine and has determined that natural gas from a third country is to be brought into the customs territory of or otherwise placed on the Union market; · (8) ‘customs authority’ means a customs authority as defined in Article 5, point (1), of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council; · (9) ‘competent authority’ means a competent authority as defined in Article 2, point (7), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council; · (10) ‘regulatory authority’ means a regulatory authority designated in accordance with Article 76(1) of Directive (EU) 2024/1788; · (11) ‘control’ means control as defined in Article 2, point (55), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788; · (12) ‘long-term LNG terminal services’ means services provided by LNG system operators to customers, in particular offloading, storage, sending out, berthing (loading and unloading), regassification, backhaul liquefaction, truck loading, bunkering of LNG, and including ancillary services and temporary storage necessary for the re-gasification process and subsequent delivery to the transmission system under contracts with a duration of more than one year; · (13) ‘interconnection point’ means an interconnection point as defined in Article 2, point (63), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788; · (14) ‘entry point’ means an entry point as defined in Article 2, point (61), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788; · (15) ‘virtual trading point’ means virtual trading point as defined in Article 2, point (59), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788; · (16) ’contracted quantities’ means the quantities of natural gas that the buyer or the importer is obligated to purchase and the seller or the exporter is obligated to provide, as specified in the supply contract, excluding volumes arising from adjustments to the contract, such as make-up quantities, shortfall recoveries, or other volumetric modifications under the terms of the contract; for long-term supply contracts, it means the annual contracted quantities; · (17) ‘make-up quantities’ mean the volumes of natural gas which a purchaser or the importer is entitled or obligated to take delivery of and pay for in subsequent periods, in compliance with minimum take-or-pay requirements and in order to compensate for any shortfall in the quantities contracted but not taken in prior periods, as provided for in a long-term supply contract; · (18) ‘delivery schedule’ means the timetable or plan agreed between the parties to a gas supply contract, specifying the quantities of gas to be delivered by the seller or the exporter and received by the buyer or the importer over defined time intervals, including the timing, location, and conditions of delivery, as set forth in a supply contract or any related operational procedures; · (19) ‘nomination’ means a nomination as defined in Article 2, point (8), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council; · (20) ‘oil’ means crude oil, natural gas liquids, refinery feedstocks, additives and oxygenates and other hydrocarbons and oil products falling under CN codes 2709 and 2710. · (20a) ‘import’ means the placing of goods under release for free circulation, as referred to in Article 201 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council; · (20b) 'temporary storage' means temporary storage as defined in Article 5, point (17) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council; · (20c) ‘country of production’ means the country where the natural gas is extracted; in cases where the natural gas is extracted in one country, but liquified or re-gasified in another country, the country of production is considered to be the country of extraction; · (20d) ‘natural gas undertakings’ means natural gas undertakings as defined in Article 2 point 15 of Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council; · (20e) ‘pipeline operator’ means a natural or legal person responsible for planning, organising, supervising or conducting activities associated with the operation of the pipeline; · (20f) ‘significant influence’ means significant influence as defined in Article 1 point (5) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/676. · CHAPTER II · STEPWISE BAN OF NATURAL GAS IMPORTS FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION · Article 3 · Prohibition of natural gas imports from the Russian Federation · 1. The import of natural gas in gaseous state via pipelines, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, and temporary storage of such gas shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2026 unless one of the exceptions in Article 4 applies. · 2. The import and the temporary storage of LNG, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2026, unless one of the exceptions in Article 4 applies. · Article 4 · Transition phase for existing supply contracts · 1. Where the importer can demonstrate to customs authorities that imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a short-term supply contract concluded before 17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, Article 3 shall apply as of 17 June 2026. · ▌ · 3. Where the importer can demonstrate to customs authorities that imports of natural gas referred to in Article 3 are executed under a long-term supply contract concluded before 17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, Article 3 shall apply as of 1 January 2027. · 4. The quantities of imports made in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not exceed the contracted quantities. · Article 5 · Prohibition to provide LNG long-term terminal services to Russian customers · The provision of long-term LNG terminal services in the Union to entities established in the Russian Federation or to entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly via various frameworks, such as intermediate structures or subsidiaries, by natural persons or legal entities established in the Russian Federation or under significant influence of the Russian Federation shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2026. · Article 6 · Transition phase for LNG terminal services under existing contracts · Where the provider of long-term LNG terminal services referred to in Article 5 can demonstrate to customs authorities that those services are provided under a contract concluded before 17 June 2025 and not amended thereafter, Article 5 shall apply as of 1 January 2027. · CHAPTER IIa · BAN OF OIL IMPORTS FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION · Article 6a · Prohibition of oil imports, including petroleum product imports, from the Russian Federation · The import and temporary storage of oil, including petroleum products, which originate in or are exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation as well as of petroleum products obtained in a third country from crude oil originating in the Russian Federation, shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2026. · Article 6b · Submission and verification of relevant information · (1) Importers of the products referred to in Article 6a shall provide customs authorities with relevant information and evidence necessary to implement that Article. · (2) The information and evidence referred to in paragraph 1 shall allow the customs authorities to establish: · (a) in the case of crude oil: the country of origin of that oil; · (b) in the case of petroleum products: the country of origin of the product or, where the product is imported from a third country, the country of origin of the crude oil on the basis of which the product was obtained. · By means of an implementing act, the Commission shall, by no later than 5 days after entry into force of this Regulation, determine the minimum standards for such evidence, including the type, format and authentication requirements, in order to ensure uniform application across Member States. · In case where customs authorities consider that the evidence provided in relation to a good as referred to in Article 6a is not conclusive, they shall refuse the release for free circulation or the temporary storage of that good. · (3) Operators of oil pipelines transporting crude oil into the territory of the Union shall analyse and verify the geographic origin of all oil volumes entering the Union at border entry points. · Pipeline operators shall submit, on a quarterly basis, the following to the competent national authority of the Member State where the entry point is located: · (a) a summary report of origin certifications for all imported oil volumes; · (b) copies of all corresponding countries of origin; · (c) notification of any discrepancies or suspected falsifications. · Competent authorities of the Member States shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections and audits of pipeline entry points, to request full documentation relating to the origin of imported oil and to require enforcement measures in cases of non-compliance. · Pipeline operators shall retain all records and origin certifications for a minimum of five years and make them available for inspection upon request. · CHAPTER III · SUBMISSION AND EXCHANGE OF RELEVANT INFORMATION · Article 7 · Submission of relevant information ▌ · 1. Importers of natural gas, and/or natural gas undertakings where appropriate, shall provide customs authorities with all relevant information necessary to implement Articles 3 and 4, in particular appropriate evidence, such as evidence of independent verification of the country of production, which may include upstream delivery documentation and satellite tracking of LNG tankers to verify whether the natural gas originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation. · For the purposes of application of Article 4, importers of natural gas shall provide customs authorities and other authorities involved in the monitoring pursuant to Article 9 and 10, with appropriate evidence to assess whether the conditions set out in ▌Article 4 are met. · 2. Where natural gas, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, is imported or temporarily stored pursuant to Article 4, that import or temporary storage shall be subject to prior authorisation from customs authorities. Importers shall provide to the customs authorities, no later than one month before the planned date of import or temporary storage, at least the following information: · (a) the date of the conclusion of the gas supply contract; · (b) the duration of the gas supply contract; · (c) the contracted gas quantities, including all upward or downward flexibility rights; · (d) the identity of the parties to the gas supply contract, including, for parties registered in the EU, the Economic Operator Registration and Identification (EORI) number; · (e) the producer of the gas and the country of production, and, as appropriate, the country where the gas was further processed; · (f) for LNG imports, the place of liquefaction and the port of first loading, as well as all the evidence needed to prevent flag of convenience and shadow fleets; · (g) the delivery points, including possible flexibilities concerning the delivery point. · (h) any modification of the gas supply contract, indicating content and date of the modification, with the exception of modifications which relate solely to the gas price; · 2a. Imports of natural gas produced in countries other than the Russian Federation shall be subject to prior authorisation, except in the cases set out in paragraph 2b. Importers shall provide the customs authorities and other authorities in the Member State where the gas is to be imported or temporarily stored, no later than one month before the planned date of import or temporary storage, with unambiguous evidence to establish the country of production of the natural gas. · In order to ensure uniform application of paragraph 1 across Member States, the Commission shall, by ... [5 days after entry into force of this Regulation], adopt implementing acts determining the minimum standards for evidence referred to in that paragraph, including the type, format and authentication requirements. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 15a(2). · On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency relating to significant risks for trade and security stemming from possible circumvention of this Regulation, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 15a(3). · Member States shall cooperate with one another and with the Commission in the assessment of applications for prior authorisation. Where there are indications of falsification, fraud or circumvention, OLAF, in line with its mandate, shall provide support to the customs and other competent authorities. · Information on authorisations granted, refused or revoked shall be transmitted without delay to the Commission and shared within the Gas Coordination Group, in order to enhance transparency and assist Member States in preventing circumvention, minimising risk and combating fraud. · On its own initiative, or following a notification from a Member State, the Commission may request additional information from the customs authorities for the purpose of ensuring a uniform application of the criteria used for the authorisation procedure. · 2b. No prior authorisation shall be required where the gas is imported from a gas-producing country which prohibits the import of natural gas produced in the Russian Federation. · In order to facilitate the application of paragraph 1 across Member States, the Commission shall, by ... [5 days after entry into force of this Regulation], adopt implementing acts setting out the list of countries which prohibit the import of natural gas produced in the Russian Federation. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 15a(2). The Commission shall review that list every three months and, where appropriate, amend it. · On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency relating to significant risks for trade and security stemming from possible circumvention of this Regulation, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 15a(3). · 3. Customs authorities or other authorities involved in the monitoring pursuant to Article 9 and 10, may request more detailed information, except price information, if the required information is necessary to assess whether the conditions set out in Article 3 and 4 are fulfilled. Customs authorities may, in particular, require importers to submit the text of certain provisions of the gas supply contract in full or the text of entire gas supply contract, except price information, especially where certain contractual provisions are interrelated, or where the full knowledge of the formulation of the contractual provisions is crucial for the assessment. In cases where the customs authorities consider that the evidence provided is not conclusive, they shall refuse the release for free circulation or the temporary storage of the goods. · 4. Natural gas entering ▌the Union through the following interconnection points shall be presumed to be exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation▌. · (a) Imatra (FI/RU); · (b) Narva (EE/RU); · (c) Värska (EE/RU); · (d) Luhamaa (EE/RU); · (e) Šakiai (LT/RU); · (f) Kotlovka (LT/BY); · (g) Kondratki (PL/BY); · (h) Wysokoje (PL/BY); · (i) Tieterowka (PL/BY); · (j) Kobryń (PL/BY); · (k) Greifswald (DE/RU); · (ka) Strandzha 1 (BG) - Malkoclar (TR) · (l) Strandzha 2 (BG)/Malkoclar (TR) – TurkStream · (m) Kiskundorozsma-2 (HU) / Horgos (RS) · (n) Kiskundorozsma (HU/RS) · (o) Kireevo (BG) / Zaychar (RS) · (p) Kalotina (BG)/ Dimitrovgrad (RS) · 4a. The Commission shall adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 15b to amend the list of interconnection points set out in paragraph 4, where there is evidence that such revision and updating are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the implementation of Articles 3 and 4. · Article 8 · Submission of relevant information by providers of LNG terminal services · Providers of LNG terminal services to customers established in the Russian Federation or owned or controlled directly or indirectly via various frameworks, such as intermediate structures or subsidiaries, by natural persons or legal entities established in the Russian Federation or under significant influence of the Russian Federation, shall provide customs authorities with relevant information for the implementation of Articles 5 and 6. · Article 9 · Effective monitoring · 1. Customs authorities, and, where relevant, competent authorities and regulatory authorities, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) and the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), shall ensure effective monitoring of the provisions in Chapter II and [IIa], and when necessary, make full use of their enforcement powers, and cooperate closely with other relevant national authorities, authorities from other Member States, international authorities and the Commission. · The monitoring of Chapters II and IIa referred to in the first subparagraph shall include monitoring of any maritime transport practices in the territorial waters of Member States that may obscure the true origin of LNG or oil shipments and of the so called shadow fleets, including by requesting any relevant documentation, which could be employed to supply LNG or oil of Russian origin to the Union. · Member States shall ensure that the customs authorities and other relevant authorities have adequate powers, functional independence and the capabilities to fulfil the obligations set out in this Regulation. · Where the Commission has doubts as to the effectiveness of monitoring at the national level, it shall request the necessary information from the customs authorities. · 2. The Commission shall continuously monitor the development of the Union’s energy security of supply risks in relation to energy imports from the Russian Federation. · 3. The Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, shall monitor the total volumes of natural gas imported through third countries, especially those suspected of enabling circumvention, regardless of the declared origin of the imported natural gas, in order to assess potential risks of circumvention of Articles 3 and 5. · In addition, the Commission shall provide, within the framework of its annual State of the Energy Union report to the European Parliament and the Council, a dedicated annex on natural gas flows from the third countries, including an assessment of identified risks of circumvention, as well as the implementation and effectiveness of framework for verifying the origin of oil, including petroleum products. · 4. The Commission shall carry out a risk-based analysis of LNG terminals, in order to identify those for which there are reasonable grounds to suspect that there is a risk that the natural gas being imported is wholly or partially of Russian origin. Based on that analysis, the Commission shall, by three months after the entry into force of this Regulation, establish a list of such LNG terminals. That list shall be reviewed at least three months and, where necessary, updated. Where appropriate, the Commission shall propose measures, including legislative proposals, to mitigate those risks. · 5. By 1 March 2026, the Commission shall analyse imports into the Union of petrochemical products falling under CN Code 39 obtained in third countries from crude oil originating in Russia and assess their impact on the Union market. Where that analysis confirms market disruptions, the Commission shall take appropriate measures, which may include a legislative proposal. · Article 10 · Transparency and exchange of information · Customs authorities shall exchange the information received from natural gas importers with regulatory authorities, competent authorities, OLAF, EPPO, ACER and the Commission to the extent necessary to ensure effective assessment whether the conditions set out in Articles 3 to 6 of this Regulation are fulfilled. Customs authorities from different Member States shall exchange information received from natural gas importers to the extent necessary, and cooperate with each other in order to ensure effective enforcement in accordance with the requirements of this Regulation and to avoid circumvention. They shall make use of existing tools and databases allowing that relevant information can be effectively exchanged between national authorities in their Member State and authorities in other Member States, or put such tools in place where necessary. · By 31 March 2026 and 31 March 2027, ACER shall, based on the data received under this Regulation and own information, publish a report providing an overview of contracts on the supply of gas originating in or directly or indirectly exported from Russia, and assessing the impact of diversification on energy markets. · The Commission and ACER shall share relevant information on contracts on the import of Russian gas in their possession with customs authorities where appropriate to facilitate the enforcement of this Regulation. · Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the exchange of information referred to in the first subparagraph. · The Commission shall, on the basis of information received from customs authorities of the Member States pursuant to Articles 7 and 10, publish on a quarterly basis non-confidential and aggregated information, including the entry point, volume, and stated origin of all gas imported into the Union. The Commission shall ensure the information is made publicly accessible in a clear and timely manner. · Article 10a · Penalties · 1. Notwithstanding provisions in Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, the Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of Chapter II, Articles 7 and 8 and Chapter IIIa and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. · The penalties provided for shall be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, and shall include administrative fines. In determining the penalties, Member States shall take into account the nature, gravity, and duration of the infringement, the degree of cooperation with the competent authorities, any financial benefits gained or losses avoided by the company as a result of the infringement, any previous infringements by the company, and any mitigating or aggravating circumstances applicable to the case. · The minimum administrative fines shall be 5% of the undertaking’s total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding financial year. · 2. Member States shall, by one month after the enter into force of this Regulation, notify the Commission of those rules, and shall notify it, without delay, of any subsequent amendment affecting them. · CHAPTER IV · NATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION PLANS · Article 11 · National diversification plans for natural gas · 1. Member States shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversify their gas supplies, to discontinue all imports and temporary storage, where applicable, of natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation within the deadline for the full prohibition of Russian imports on 1 January 2027. · 2. The national diversification plan for natural gas shall include all the following: · (a) available information on the volume of imports of natural gas, as well as a breakdown of the volumes of natural gas consumed on the national territory of the Member State, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation under existing supply contracts, as well as on LNG terminal services contracted by natural or legal persons established in the Russian Federation, where applicable; · (b) ▌ measures in place and planned at national level to replace natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, including the quantities expected to be phased out, milestones and timeline of implementation and, insofar as available, envisaged options for alternative supplies and supply routes. Such measures may notably include the use of the Aggregate EU Platform pursuant to Article 43 of Directive (EU) 2024/718, support measures for diversification efforts of energy companies, cooperation in regional groups such as the CESEC High-Level Group, identifying alternatives to natural gas imports via electrification, energy sufficiency, energy efficiency measures, boosting the production of biogas, biomethane and clean hydrogen, renewable energy deployment or voluntary demand reduction measures; · (ba) measures in place and planned at national level to ensure full transparency, traceability of natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, including measures on verification of possible re-labelled imports; · (bb) measures in place to ensure that natural gas traded on spot markets is traceable to its country of production; · (c) identification of any potential technical, contractual or regulatory barriers to replace natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, and options to overcome those barriers. · 3. By 1 March 2026, Member States shall submit to the Commission ▌ their national diversification plans using the template set out in Annex I. · 3a. For the purpose of paragraph 2 point (a), importers shall report to the competent authorities of the Member States the origin and quantities of imported natural gas. The relevant competent authorities shall verify the accuracy of the submitted information, and importers shall fully cooperate with the authorities during this verification process. In justified cases, the Commission may carry out additional verifications to ensure the quality and consistency of the data. · 4. The Commission shall facilitate the preparation and implementation of the national diversification plans for natural gas where appropriate, including by providing best practices and technical assistance. Member States shall report regularly to the Gas Coordination Group established by Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 on the progress achieved with the preparation, adoption and implementation of those plans. On the basis of the national diversification plans, the Commission shall assess the implementation of the phase out of Russian gas and report it to the Gas Coordination Group, as per Article 13 of this Regulation. · Article 12 · National diversification plans for oil, including petroleum products · 1. In order to ensure the implementation of the prohibition on imports of oil, including petroleum products, referred to in Article 6a, without disruption, Member States ▌shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversify their oil supplies, ▌by 1 January 2026. · 2. The national diversification plan for oil, including petroleum products, shall include all the following: · (a) available information on the volume of direct or indirect imports of oil, including petroleum products, imports from Russia under existing supply contracts; · (b) measures planned at national level to replace oil, including petroleum products, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, including the quantities expected to be phased out, milestones and timeline of implementation, and options for alternative supplies, ▌ supply routes and energy sources; · (ba) measures in place and planned at national level to ensure full transparency, traceability of oil, including petroleum products, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, including measures on verification of possible re-labelled imports; · (bb) measures in place and planned at national level for implementation of framework for verifying the country of origin of oil, including petroleum products; · (bc) where introduced by the Member State concerned, measures taken in order to prevent the Russia’ shadow fleets from entering its territorial waters or using its ports; · (c) potential technical or regulatory barriers to replace oil, including petroleum products, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, and options to overcome those barriers. · 3. By 1 March 2026, Member States shall notify the Commission of their national diversification plans in accordance with / using the template set out in Annex II. · 4. The Commission shall facilitate the preparation and implementation of the national diversification plans for oil, including by providing best practices and technical assistance where appropriate. Member States shall report regularly to the Oil Coordination Group established by Article 17 of Council Directive 2009/119/EC on the progress achieved with the preparation, adoption and implementation of those national diversification plans. · 5. Where the national diversification plan for oil identifies a risk that the objective of implementing the prohibition of Russian oil by 1 January 2026 may not be achieved, the Commission may issue a decision, after assessing the plan, to the respective Member State on how to achieve the implementation in a timely manner. Following that decision, the Member State shall update its diversification plan within three months, taking into consideration the Commission’s decision. · CHAPTER V · MONITORING OF SECURITY OF GAS SUPPLY · Article 13 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 · Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is amended as follows: · (1) in Article 2, the following points (32) and (33) are added: · ‘(33) ‘take-or-pay provision’ means a contractual provision which obliges the buyer to either take delivery of, or alternatively pay for a specified minimum quantity of gas within a given period, regardless of whether the gas is actually received; · (34) deliver-or-pay provisions’ means a contractual provision which obliges the seller to pay a contractual fine in case of non-delivery of gas.’; · (2) Article 14(6) is amended as follows: · (a) in the first subparagraph, the following point (c) is added: · ‘(c) to the Commission and to the concerned competent authority the following information relating to supply contracts for natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation: · (i) the information referred to in Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) XX/2025 - this Regulation; · (ii) information on quantities to be supplied and taken, including possible flexibilities under take-or-pay provisions or deliver-or-pay provisions; · (iii) delivery schedules (LNG) or nominations (pipeline gas); · (iv) possible contractual flexibilities concerning the annual contracted quantities, including make-up quantities; · (v) conditions for the suspension or termination of gas deliveries, including force majeure provisions; · (vi) information on which law is governing the contract and which arbitration mechanism is chosen; · (vii) key elements of other commercial agreements that are relevant for the execution of the gas supply contract, excluding price information.’; · (b) the following third and fourth subparagraphs are added: · ‘The information referred to in point (c) shall be provided for each contract in a disaggregated format, including the full relevant text parts, excluding price information, notably where the full knowledge of the formulation of the contractual provisions is crucial for the security of supply assessment or where certain contractual provisions are interrelated. · Providers of LNG terminal services shall provide the Commission with information concerning services booked by customers from the Russian Federation,’ customers controlled by undertakings from the Russian Federation, including contracted services, affected quantities and contract duration.’; · (3) in Article 17, the second paragraph is replaced by the following: · ‘The Commission shall carry a continuous monitoring of an exposure of the Union’s energy system to Russian gas supplies, also via third countries notably on the basis of information notified to competent authorities pursuant to Article 14(6), point (c). · The Commission shall assess the implementation of the phase out of Russian gas pursuant to Regulation (EU) XX/2025 at national, regional and Union level on the basis of the national diversification plans pursuant to Article 11 of that Regulation. This assessment shall be reported to the Gas Coordination Group. · On the basis of the conclusions of the assessment referred to in the third paragraph, the Commission shall publish an annual report, which shall provide a comprehensive overview of the progress achieved by Member States in implementing their national diversification plans. · Where relevant, the report referred to in the fourth paragraph may be accompanied by a Commission decision which identifies possible actions and measures to ensure secure supply diversification and a timely phase out of Russian gas. · The Member States concerned shall update their national diversification plan within three months, taking into consideration the Commission’s decision.’. · CHAPTER VI · FINAL PROVISIONS · Article 14 · Professional secrecy · 1. Any confidential information received, exchanged, or transmitted pursuant to this Regulation shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy laid down in this Article. · 2. The obligation of professional secrecy shall apply to all persons who work or who have worked for authorities involved in the implementation of this Regulation or any natural or legal person to whom the relevant authorities have delegated its powers, including auditors and experts contracted by the competent authorities. · 3. Information covered by professional secrecy shall not be disclosed to any other person or authority except by virtue of provisions laid down by Union or national law. · 4. All information exchanged between the relevant authorities under this Regulation that concerns business or operational conditions, and other economic or personal affairs shall be considered confidential and shall be subject to the requirements of professional secrecy, except where the competent authority states at the time of communication that such information may be disclosed or where such disclosure is necessary for legal proceedings. · ▌ · Article 15a · Committee Procedure · 1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. · 2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply. · 3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, in conjunction with Article 4 thereof, shall apply. · Article 15b · Exercise of the delegation · 1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article. · 2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Article 7 shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from … [date of entry into force]. · 3. The delegation of power referred to in Article 7 may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force. · 4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making. · 5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council. · 6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 7 shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by [two months] at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council. · Article 16 · Entry into force · This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. · This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. · Done at Strasbourg, · The President · ANNEX I · Template for national diversification plans for natural gas · This template is designed for national authorities drafting a national diversification plan as provided for in Article 11. It shall include the following: · General information

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2. Amendment 2ESNProposal for a regulation

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3. Amendment 3ESNProposal for a regulation · Recital 1
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   (1) The unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 revealed the dramatic consequences of the existing dependencies on Russian natural gas on markets and security. In their Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022, Heads of States therefore agreed to gradually decrease and eventually fully remove the dependency on Russian energy. The REPowerEU Communication of 8 March 20223 and the REPowerEU Plan of 18 May 20224 proposed concrete measures to allow the full diversification away from Russian energy imports in a safe, affordable and sustainable manner. Significant progress in the process to diversify gas supplies away from Russia was achieved since then. As…

   Amendment

   (1) The unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 revealed the dramatic consequences of the existing dependencies on Russian natural gas on markets and security. In their Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022, Heads of States therefore agreed to gradually decrease and eventually fully remove the dependency on Russian energy. The REPowerEU Communication of 8 March 20223 and the REPowerEU Plan of 18 May 20224 proposed concrete measures to allow the full diversification away from Russian energy imports in a safe, affordable and sustainable manner. Significant progress in the process to diversify gas supplies away from Russia was achieved since then. __…

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4. Amendment 4ESNProposal for a regulation · Recital 2
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   (2) Multiple examples of unannounced and unjustified supply reductions and interruptions already before the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, and the weaponisation of energy by the Russian Federation since then, show that the Russian Federation systematically used existing dependencies on Russian gas supplies to harm the Union’s economy. This leads to serious negative effects on Member States and the Union’s economic security in general. The Russian Federation and its energy companies can therefore no longer be considered reliable energy trading partners by the Union.

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5. Amendment 5ESNProposal for a regulation · Recital 11 a (new)
   Amendment

   (11 a) Recalls that, unlike hydrocarbons such as gas and oil, it is possible to store the equivalent of several years of nuclear fuel consumption. This characteristic makes it possible to avoid exposure to geopolitical fluctuations and to ensure genuine energy sovereignty.

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6. Amendment 6ESNProposal for a regulation · Recital 16
   Current text

   (16) While it appears justified to exempt existing “legacy” contracts from the immediate application, not all contracts entered into before the entry into force of this Regulation should benefit from such exemption. Indeed, there may be an incentive by Russian suppliers to use the time between the publication of this proposal until the entry into force of the ban to increase current supplies, by concluding new contracts, increasing volumes by changing existing contracts or using flexibilities under existing contracts. In order to ensure that imports from Russia do not increase but decrease as a result of the proposed Regulation, measures should be included in the Regulation to avoid a “rush”…

   Amendment

   (16) Adjustments to existing contracts which are necessary to ensure security of supply or to adapt to market developments should not, as such, be considered as new contracts.

   Excerpt — full text in the official PDF.
   official amendment document ↗
7. Amendment 7ESNProposal for a regulation · Recital 17
   Current text

   (17) In order to avoid that import volumes provided for in existing supply contracts are increased and not decreased, amendments to existing supply contracts should be considered as new contracts for the purposes of this Regulation, and increases of import volumes by using contractual flexibilities should not benefit from the transition period.

   Amendment

   deleted

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8. Amendment 8ESNProposal for a regulation · Recital 18
   Current text

   (18) This Regulation creates a clear legal prohibition to import Russian natural gas, constituting a sovereign act of the Union beyond the control of gas importers and rendering the performance of natural gas imports from Russia unlawful, with direct legal effect and without any discretion for Member States concerning its application.

   Amendment

   deleted

   official amendment document ↗
9. Amendment 9ESNProposal for a regulation · Recital 20
   Current text

   (20) In particular, importers of natural gas should be obliged to provide customs authorities with all information necessary to establish the origin and the point of export of natural gas imported into the Union and to decide whether the imported gas falls under the general prohibition or one of its exceptions. As the contractual conditions determining the elements relevant for the assessment of the customs authorities are often complex, customs authorities should be given the power to ask importers for detailed contract information, including entire supply contracts, excluding price information, where this is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other cont…

   Amendment

   (20) In order to verify the origin and the place of export of natural gas imported into the Union and to determine whether such imports fall under the general prohibition or one of its exceptions, the competent national authorities should be able, where justified, to request from importers the information necessary in a specific case. Such requests should be duly reasoned and limited to what is strictly required for the assessment in question, and should respect the protection of business secrets and commercially sensitive information. The Regulation should include rules to ensure an effective protection of business secrets of concerned undertakings.

   Excerpt — full text in the official PDF.
   official amendment document ↗
10. Amendment 10ESNProposal for a regulation · Recital 23
    Current text

    (23) Experience with the announced phase out of gas supplies via Ukraine has shown that good preparation and coordination in a spirit of solidarity can effectively avoid market disruptions or security of supply problems potentially resulting from changing gas suppliers. To prepare for the full phase out of Russian gas in 2028 in a coordinated manner and to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes involved without risk for security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy prices, Member States should prepare national diversification plans and present them by 1 March 2026. Those plans should describe intended measures at national or regional level to reduce demand, fost…

    Amendment

    deleted

    Excerpt — full text in the official PDF.
    official amendment document ↗
11. Amendment 11ESNProposal for a regulation · Recital 24
    Current text

    (24) In their Versailles Declaration, the Heads of Member States committed not only to phase out natural gas supplies from Russia, but also other energy supplies, notably oil supplies. While restrictive measures to ensure the phase out of oil imports from Russia are already in place, and oil imports have decreased significantly, a further phase out of Russian oil may require specific preparatory steps and coordination with neighbours. Member States should therefore prepare national diversification plans also for oil, with a possibility for the Commission to provide recommendations on those plans.

    Amendment

    (24) In their Versailles Declaration, the Heads of Member States committed not only to phase out natural gas supplies from Russia, but also other energy supplies, notably oil supplies. While restrictive measures to ensure the phase out of oil imports from Russia are already in place, and oil imports have decreased significantly, a further phase out of Russian oil may require specific preparatory steps and coordination with neighbours. Member States may, on a voluntary basis, therefore prepare national diversification plans also for oil, with a possibility for the Commission to provide recommendations on those plans.

    official amendment document ↗
12. Amendment 12ESNProposal for a regulation · Recital 25
    Current text

    (25) Experience during the gas crisis of 2022 and 2023 has shown that showed that comprehensive information on the supply situation and possible supply dependencies is crucial to monitor gas supply in the Union. Therefore importers of Russian gas making use of the exemptions laid down in this Regulation should submit to the Commission all information which is necessary to effectively evaluate possible risks for gas trade. That information should include key parameters, or even whole text parts, of the relevant gas supply contracts, excluding price information, where this is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other provisions in the contract. When monitori…

    Amendment

    (25) Experience during the gas crisis of 2022 and 2023 has shown that showed that comprehensive information on the supply situation and possible supply dependencies is crucial to monitor gas supply in the Union. Therefore importers of Russian gas making use of the exemptions laid down in this Regulation should submit to the Commission all information which is necessary to effectively evaluate possible risks for gas trade. That information should include key parameters, or even whole text parts, of the relevant gas supply contracts, excluding price information, where this is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other provisions in the contract. When monitori…

    Excerpt — full text in the official PDF.
    official amendment document ↗
13. Amendment 13ESNProposal for a regulation · Recital 28
    Current text

    (28) The proposed measures fully reflect the principle of energy solidarity. Indeed, the level of exposure to Russian gas imports differs between Member States, and many Member States have already taken measures to phase out Russian gas. The proposal for this Regulation will ensure an EU-wide harmonised approach to the phase out of Russian gas, preserving solidarity between Member States.

    Amendment

    (28) The proposed measures fully reflect the principle of energy solidarity. Indeed, the level of exposure to Russian gas imports differs between Member States, and many Member States have already taken measures to phase out Russian gas.

    official amendment document ↗
14. Amendment 14ESNProposal for a regulation · Recital 30
    Current text

    (30) In view of the importance for the Union to phase out further economic dependence of the Union on gas imports from the Russian Federation without any delay, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

    Amendment

    deleted

    official amendment document ↗
15. Amendment 15ESNProposal for a regulation · Article 1 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
    Current text

    This Regulation provides a framework for effectively removing the Union’s exposure to the significant risks for trade and security, resulting from gas trade with the Russian Federation by laying down:

    Amendment

    This Regulation establishes a framework for the voluntary cooperation of the Member States in order to assess and, where appropriate, mitigate risks to trade and security which may arise from energy imports from third countries. It shall be without prejudice to the Member States’ competence to choose their energy sources, suppliers and contractual arrangements.”

    official amendment document ↗
16. Amendment 16ESNProposal for a regulation · Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point a
    Current text

    (a) a stepwise prohibition of imports of natural gas from the Russian Federation and of the provision of LNG terminal services;

    Amendment

    deleted

    official amendment document ↗
17. Amendment 17ESNProposal for a regulation · Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point b
    Current text

    (b) rules to effectively implement and monitor that prohibition as well as the phase out of oil imports from Russia;

    Amendment

    deleted

    official amendment document ↗
18. Amendment 18ESNProposal for a regulation · Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point c
    Current text

    (c) provisions to better assess the security of energy supplies in the Union.

    Amendment

    deleted

    official amendment document ↗
19. Amendment 19ESNProposal for a regulation · Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new)
    Amendment

    Energy solidarity refers exclusively to mutual support between Member States in situations of actual supply crises, in particular through technical cooperation and emergency deliveries. It shall not entail an obligation for Member States to adopt uniform external, security or sanctions policies in the field of energy.

    official amendment document ↗
20. Amendment 20ESNProposal for a regulation · Article 3 – paragraph 1
    Current text

    1. The import of natural gas in gaseous state via pipelines, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2026 unless one of the exceptions in Article 4 applies.

    Amendment

    1. Member States may decide, for reasons of their national security or energy supply security, to restrict or to put an end to the import of natural gas originating in certain third countries. The Union shall support the voluntary coordination of such measures between Member States.”

    official amendment document ↗
21. Amendment 21ESNProposal for a regulation · Article 3 – paragraph 2
    Current text

    2. The import of LNG, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2026, unless one of the exceptions in Article 4 applies.

    Amendment

    deleted

    official amendment document ↗
22. Amendment 22ESNProposal for a regulation · Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 1
    Amendment

    (1) Existing supply contracts for natural gas which are lawful under the national law of the Member State concerned, including any amendments thereto and the use of contractual flexibility mechanisms, shall remain unaffected by this Regulation. They shall not be considered as new contracts solely because of adjustments made to ensure security of supply or to adapt to market developments.

    official amendment document ↗
23. Amendment 23ESNProposal for a regulation · Article 5 – paragraph 1
    Current text

    The provision of long-term LNG terminal services in the EU to entities established in the Russian Federation or entities controlled by natural persons or legal entities established in the Russian Federation shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2026.

    Amendment

    Operators of LNG facilities may refuse to conclude, extend or make use of long-term LNG terminal services contracts with undertakings from third countries where this is required under the national law of the Member State concerned and in the light of its energy supply security or public policy considerations.

    official amendment document ↗
24. Amendment 24ESNProposal for a regulation · Article 11 – paragraph 1
    Current text

    1. Member States shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversify their gas supplies, to discontinue all imports of natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation within the deadline for the full prohibition of Russian imports on 1 January 2028.

    Amendment

    1. Member States may, on a voluntary basis, draw up national diversification plans for natural gas and submit them to the Commission for information. The Commission shall publish non-binding guidelines and examples of best practices, but shall not lay down binding requirements as regards the content, objectives or timelines of national energy policies.”

    official amendment document ↗
25. Amendment 25ESNProposal for a regulation · Article 12 – paragraph 1
    Current text

    1. Where Member States receive imports of oil originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian federation, they shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversify their oil supplies, to discontinue, by 1 January 2028, imports of oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

    Amendment

    1. Member States may, on a voluntary basis, draw up national diversification plans for oil and submit them to the Commission for information. The Commission shall publish non-binding guidelines and examples of best practices, but shall not lay down binding requirements as regards the content, objectives or timelines of national energy policies.

    official amendment document ↗
26. Amendment 26ESNProposal for a regulation · Article 12 – paragraph 1 a (new)
    Amendment

    1 a. Existing supply contracts for natural gas which are lawful under the national law of the Member State concerned, including any amendments thereto and the use of contractual flexibility mechanisms, shall remain unaffected by this Regulation. They shall not be considered as new contracts solely because of adjustments made to ensure security of supply or to adapt to market developments

    official amendment document ↗
27. Amendment 27INTA, ITREProposal for a regulation

    Replaces or inserts a longer passage — full text in the official document.

    official amendment document ↗
28. Amendment 28INTA, ITREDraft legislative resolution · Paragraph 1 a (new)
    Amendment

    1a. Takes note of the statement by the Commission annexed to this resolution, which will be published in the L series of the Official Journal of the European Union together with the final legislative act;

    official amendment document ↗