European Central Bank – annual report 2025

Amendments tabled for the plenary sitting on this text, in their own numbering series. This is a different set from the committee amendments tracked elsewhere on AmendEU, and is not counted in any of the site’s amendment totals.

1. Amendment 1The LeftMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 8
   Current text

   8. Expresses concern at the high levels of inflation in the years following the COVID-19 pandemic, instigated by supply shocks; notes that a timely return to price stability in this period would have been warranted through ECB decisions; invites the ECB to thoroughly assess the causes of these high levels of inflation in its annual report, along with a set of policy recommendations to draw the right conclusions from any future inflationary crises;

   Amendment

   8. Expresses concern at the high levels of inflation in the years following the COVID-19 pandemic, instigated by supply shocks; recognises that this inflation has resulted largely from the sudden increase in fossil energy prices following the Russian invasion of Ukraine;

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2. Amendment 2The LeftMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 9 a (new)
   Amendment

   9a. Expresses concern over the high cost of living, as food and energy prices have increased in Europe since the COVID-19 pandemic; notes that, on average, the price of a meal in the euro area in 2025 was one third higher than before the pandemic1a, and that this has particularly affected low-income households. _________________ 1a European Central Bank blog, ‘When groceries bite, the role of food prices for inflation in the euro area’, 25 September 2025.

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3. Amendment 3The LeftMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 9 b (new)
   Amendment

   9b. Notes that national inflation rates can vary significantly within the euro area, with some countries suffering from deflationary rather than inflationary pressures, which can further harm the economy;

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4. Amendment 4The LeftMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 27
   Current text

   27. Supports the ECB in its efforts to accommodate the international role of the euro through, inter alia, sufficient currency swap and repo lines;

   Amendment

   27. Calls on the ECB to reduce the EU’s financial dependence on US assets by strengthening the international role of the euro; calls on the ECB to be prepared for a possible ‘sell America’ scenario, in which public and private institutions would sell off US assets on a large scale in the context of increasing US aggression;

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5. Amendment 5ECRMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 28 a (new)
   Amendment

   28a. Emphasises in this context that every Member State has the right to decide whether to adopt the euro;

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6. Amendment 6PPEMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 20
   Current text

   20. Underlines that the ECB should consider the potential effects of climate change from a price stability perspective and from within its mandate;

   Amendment

   20. Underlines that the ECB should only consider the potential effects of climate change from a price stability perspective and from within its mandate;

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7. Amendment 7RenewMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 6 a (new)
   Amendment

   6a. Echoes the statement of solidarity with regard to the US Federal Reserve made by the ECB and central banks worldwide underlining the importance of preserving central bank independence, with full respect for the rule of law and democratic accountability.

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8. Amendment 8ESNMotion for a resolution · Recital C a (new)
   Amendment

   Ca. whereas in the monetary dialogue with Parliament, the ECB’s president stated that the centralised and sole source the ECB uses for the vital macroeconomic data essential to govern the ECB’s monetary policy, especially regarding inflation data, is Eurostat, which is subordinate to the Commission;

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9. Amendment 9ESNMotion for a resolution · Recital C b (new)
   Amendment

   Cb. whereas a comparison between the compounded annual data provided by Eurostat using longer time series and the net changes calculated specifically between the respective start- and end-points provided from a variety of sources hint at a potentially significant and systematic underestimation of the annual inflation (euro area harmonised indices of consumer prices – HICP) reported by Eurostat and a smaller systematic overestimation of annual economic growth, while such probes in annual time series data are statistically necessary in order to identify potential systematic bias or errors that are invisible in shorter time frames; whereas the official annual data between 2002 and 2024 from Eur…

   Excerpt — full text in the official PDF.
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10. Amendment 10ESNMotion for a resolution · Recital C c (new)
    Amendment

    Cc. whereas the M3 money supply in the euro area has increased approximately threefold since 2002, with the strong increase over the past decade being fuelled predominantly by the zero-interest policies and the ECB’s asset purchase programmes, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas economic growth, including the addition of new countries to the euro area, strongly lags behind this threefold increase, which jointly instigates substantial inflationary tendencies;

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11. Amendment 11ESNMotion for a resolution · Recital C d (new)
    Amendment

    Cd. whereas according to the ECB’s president, the ECB does not systematically perform monitoring of inflation data and price stability, which would give it intrinsic means to verify its success at achieving its own primary goal, but rather uses macroeconomic forecast models that have repeatedly resulted in excessive optimism, leading to expansionary monetary policy and subpar performance;

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12. Amendment 12ESNMotion for a resolution · Recital E a (new)
    Amendment

    Ea. whereas the most recent ECB annual report criticised the high inflation of the past years, yet managed to avoid mentioning monetary inflation, i.e. the excessive increase in money supply compared to economic growth in goods and services during the past decade, at least once as a predominant reason for the inflation surge, despite the neutrality of money and the undisputable economic, mathematical and historical evidence for this causality in fiat-money systems;

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13. Amendment 13ESNMotion for a resolution · Recital H a (new)
    Amendment

    Ha. whereas the convergence criteria are mathematical – not political – rules designed to prevent instability in the euro area, support price stability and act as a protector of people’s purchasing power and wealth; whereas the 3 % budget deficit rule is the mathematical upper limit to a sustained deficit so as to at least ensure the mere mathematical possibility of repayment of debt (no-Ponzi scheme condition) without resorting to higher inflation, while this calculated limit was based on the substantially stronger economic growth levels of the 1990s; whereas the breaking of the deficit criterion for various political reasons has become normal and now even institutionalised in the EU, while…

    Excerpt — full text in the official PDF.
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14. Amendment 14ESNMotion for a resolution · Recital H b (new)
    Amendment

    Hb. whereas the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the euro area is substantially above the 60 % threshold as defined by the convergence criteria, and the deficit spending of several Member States, also due to the national escape clause, is equally in serious violation of the 3 % budget deficit rule, which will foreseeably affect Member States’ sovereign bond interest rates;

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15. Amendment 15ESNMotion for a resolution · Recital H c (new)
    Amendment

    Hc. whereas in our monetary system there is a general connection between property prices and excessive growth in the money supply, as property serves as a versatile form of investment for large financial players, since it is suitable collateral for further borrowing;

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16. Amendment 16ESNMotion for a resolution · Recital H d (new)
    Amendment

    Hd. whereas central banks around the world have strongly increased their gold purchases in recent years, suggesting an increasing distrust towards their own fiat money product or towards the main Western reserve currencies, such as the dollar and the euro; whereas the price of gold has approximately doubled over the last five years;

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17. Amendment 17ESNMotion for a resolution · Recital H e (new)
    Amendment

    He. whereas an increasing number of countries around the world are switching to currencies other than the dollar or euro to settle their trade, which reduces international demand for these currencies; whereas an increasing amount of international transactions no longer use SWIFT;

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18. Amendment 18ESNMotion for a resolution · Recital H f (new)
    Amendment

    Hf. whereas the escalating debt situation in the United States and the decline in trade settled in US dollars, as well as the reduction of US securities held by several countries, has led to a situation where the United States can no longer export its debt via the dollar easily without undermining the international value of the dollar, and this has led the United States to increasingly look for opportunities to artificially boost demand for the dollar, as well as US securities;

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19. Amendment 19ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 2
    Current text

    2. Underlines that the statutory independence of the ECB, as laid down in the Treaties, is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability;

    Amendment

    2. Underlines that the statutory independence of the ECB, as laid down in the Treaties, is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability; criticises the fact that the ECB relies exclusively and blindly on a body subordinate to the Commission, Eurostat, to obtain a variety of essential data on which it bases its monetary policy and steers the euro, as in practice this undermines its independence, as its policy is reliant on data provided by a body subordinate to the Commission;

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20. Amendment 20ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 3
    Current text

    3. Highlights that the ECB is accountable to Parliament; stresses that the ECB must take decisions to fulfil its mandate without political interference; notes that central banks should be independent but not isolated;

    Amendment

    3. Highlights that the ECB is accountable to Parliament, as a lack of price stability is primarily to the detriment of citizens in the euro area; stresses that the ECB must take decisions to fulfil its mandate without political interference; notes that central banks should be independent but not isolated;

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21. Amendment 21ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 5
    Current text

    5. Invites the ECB to make efforts to enhance instruments that improve transparency, such as benchmarks, insights in its model-based assumptions and the Governing Council’s assessments of inflation developments;

    Amendment

    5. Invites the ECB to make efforts to enhance instruments that improve transparency, such as benchmarks, insights in its model-based assumptions and the Governing Council’s assessments of inflation developments; calls for the continuous publication of detailed documentation on the creation, calibration and modification of its economic forecasting models, as these are of public interest as indirectly they have a significant impact on the public and, moreover, have repeatedly shown deficiencies, and been marked by excessive optimism in support of expansionary monetary policy;

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22. Amendment 22ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 6
    Current text

    6. Welcomes the independence of the ECB as enshrined in Article 130 TFEU; emphasises that independence requires the ECB’s actions to remain apolitical;

    Amendment

    6. Welcomes the independence of the ECB as enshrined in Article 130 TFEU; emphasises that independence requires the ECB’s actions to remain apolitical; reiterates that the economic rationale behind Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB is to prohibit the ECB from being used, directly or indirectly, to finance government spending by the Member States on the basis of political objectives; calls on the ECB to inform Parliament whether there have already been discussions within the board of the ECB to restart future asset purchase programmes, in order to counteract possible strong increases in interest rates on sovereign bonds caused by the current excessive s…

    Excerpt — full text in the official PDF.
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23. Amendment 23ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 6 a (new)
    Amendment

    6a. Strongly recommends the decentralisation of the ECB’s sources of macroeconomic input data, as well as the creation and use of intrinsic means for the continuous monitoring of potential systematic problems with such data, since it is so crucial for the formulation of its monetary policy and the monitoring of its primary objective;

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24. Amendment 24ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 6 b (new)
    Amendment

    6b. Points out the feasibility and statistical necessity, after more than two decades, of reviewing Eurostat’s key annual macroeconomic data by comparing compound annual macroeconomic growth and inflation figures with data from other sources using considerably longer time intervals than the current yearly intervals, in order to identify problems, systematic distortions or errors; stresses that errors or bias in annual data are difficult to detect, but if consistent or systematic bias or errors exist, this would become apparent over such longer periods, which now exist after more than two decades; calls on the ECB to carry out such statistical investigations and checks to ensure that it is st…

    Excerpt — full text in the official PDF.
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25. Amendment 25ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 6 c (new)
    Amendment

    6c. Emphasises that the subpar performance of the ECB’s macroeconomic forecast models, especially their optimism about price stability and economic growth, might also be related to the use of systematically skewed macroeconomic data from the past, as these models are generally calibrated using past data;

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26. Amendment 26ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 7
    Current text

    7. Highlights the ECB’s primary objective of maintaining price stability, which is one of the necessary conditions for growth, competitiveness and economic stability in the Union;

    Amendment

    7. Reiterates that the ECB’s only primary objective is maintaining price stability, which is one of the necessary conditions for growth, competitiveness and economic stability in the Union as well as the protection of people’s wealth and purchasing power, in order to counter the cost-of-living crisis;

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27. Amendment 27ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 8 a (new)
    Amendment

    8a. Considers that the strong increase in money supply in the decade prior to the surge in inflation, which was mainly due to the zero interest-rate policy, the asset purchase programmes and, in particular, the sharp increase in money supply immediately prior to the surge, i.e. during the COVID-19 emergency measures, combined with the sudden increase in the velocity of money following the end of the COVID-19 restrictions, as well as the sudden supply contraction of essential resources as a result of EU sanctions, created a textbook case for a predictable sharp surge in inflation due to the neutrality of money;

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28. Amendment 28ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 9
    Current text

    9. Welcomes the decline in inflation from the rates of 2022-2023 as well as the recent inflation stabilisation; notes that the ECB has cut the deposit rate by 200 basis points between June 2024 and June 2025; acknowledges the continued risk of a resurgence in inflation; underlines that further steps towards easing monetary policy should be prudent, data-driven and guided by price stability;

    Amendment

    9. Welcomes the decline in inflation from the rates of 2022-2023 as well as the recent inflation stabilisation; notes that the ECB has cut the deposit rate by 200 basis points between June 2024 and June 2025; acknowledges the continued risk of a resurgence in inflation; underlines that further steps towards easing monetary policy should be prudent, data-driven and guided by price stability; expresses concern about Member States’ increasing debt levels, their excessive deficit spending and the ensuing predictable effect on interest rates in several Member States, which will lead to renewed demands for ECB intervention with fresh money to lower interest rates via asset purchases, which in turn…

    Excerpt — full text in the official PDF.
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29. Amendment 29ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 10 a (new)
    Amendment

    10a. Highlights that the so-called ‘cost-of-living crisis’ is just another term for the significant decline in the general population’s purchasing power, while monetary inflation and a low-growth environment are generally among the main economic causes of such declines; points out that inflation adjustments often at best only raise wages up to the officially reported level, such that if inflation is systematically under-reported, this would result in a sustained decline in real wages; points to the link between sustained expansionary monetary policy and property prices, and subsequently housing prices, in a fiat money system;

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30. Amendment 30ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 12
    Current text

    12. Stresses that the ECB’s purchase programmes are unconventional monetary policy tools that have side effects; notes in particular that asset purchase programmes can distort price signals; notes that the ECB started shrinking its balance sheet only very gradually; supports the ECB in further diminishing its direct role in purchasing securities; encourages the ECB to gradually phase out its government bond purchasing programmes; regrets the impact of the fiscal position on the ECB’s fulfilment of its primary mandate;

    Amendment

    12. Stresses that the ECB’s purchase programmes are highly questionable monetary policy tools undermining the principle of monetary dominance by indirectly financing excessive government spending via the downward manipulation of bond prices, and thus debt costs, at the expense of future price stability and, consequently, the real wealth and purchasing power of the entire population of the euro area; notes that the ECB started shrinking its balance sheet only very gradually; supports the ECB in further diminishing its direct role in purchasing securities; encourages the ECB to gradually phase out its government bond purchasing programmes; regrets the impact of the fiscal position on the ECB’s…

    Excerpt — full text in the official PDF.
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31. Amendment 31ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 17 a (new)
    Amendment

    17a. Notes the sharp rise in gold prices, which highlights a potential lack of credibility of the principle of monetary dominance as well as growing mistrust among the world’s central banks towards Western reserve currencies, such as the dollar and the euro;

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32. Amendment 32ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 18 a (new)
    Amendment

    18a. Points out that the protracted period of low and zero interest rates over the last decade has undermined creative destruction and economic evolution, as it prevented inefficient companies from being forced to exit the market, because they were able to stay afloat by taking out very cheap loans, which ultimately contributed to the lack of competitiveness of the EU economy, since this undermined this vital evolutionary economic process and led to material and human resources being tied up by very inefficient companies (‘zombie companies’) that would otherwise have disappeared from the market long ago;

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33. Amendment 33ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 19 a (new)
    Amendment

    19a. Advocates against the ECB’s measures that allow unequal treatment of Member States, in particular measures that show signs of a yield spread control;

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34. Amendment 34ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 27 a (new)
    Amendment

    27a. Emphasises Parliament’s particular importance in upholding the convergence criteria, as the public is its most important stakeholder; recognises in this context that Parliament must admit its own shortcomings in this regard, as compliance with the criteria should often have been demanded more vehemently;

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35. Amendment 35ESNMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 28
    Current text

    28. Welcomes the Republic of Bulgaria as the 21st member of the euro area, as of 1 January 2026;

    Amendment

    28. Welcomes the Republic of Bulgaria as the 21st member of the euro area, as of 1 January 2026; highlights, in this regard as well as in the context of the convergence criteria, a renewed lack of diligence in the European Parliament’s critical assessment of the Maastricht criteria in the convergence report on Bulgaria’s accession to the euro area, given that, just a few months after the decision on Bulgaria’s accession, Bulgaria’s real budget deficit for 2025 revealed itself to be considerably higher than 3 % and Bulgaria’s government collapsed as a result of disputes over the 2026 budget, amid projections of even higher deficits;

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36. Amendment 36Verts/ALEMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 5
    Current text

    5. Invites the ECB to make efforts to enhance instruments that improve transparency, such as benchmarks, insights in its model-based assumptions and the Governing Council’s assessments of inflation developments;

    Amendment

    5. Invites the ECB to make efforts to enhance instruments that improve transparency, such as benchmarks, insights in its model-based assumptions and the Governing Council’s assessments of inflation developments; calls on the ECB to reincorporate a chapter into its annual report dedicated to how the ECB has interpreted and implemented its secondary objectives;

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37. Amendment 37PfEMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 20 a (new)
    Amendment

    20a. Highlights that environmental policy objectives should not be implemented using monetary policy tools;

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38. Amendment 38PfEMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 27 a (new)
    Amendment

    27a. Stresses that the ECB should also take into account the potential drawbacks of the euro having a stronger international role and being a global reserve currency, including its potential overvaluation;

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39. Amendment 39PfEMotion for a resolution · Paragraph 35
    Current text

    35. Reiterates that the nominations to the ECB’s Executive Board should be gender-balanced, merit and ability-based, with shortlists submitted to Parliament, and that people of all genders should have equal opportunities to serve as governors of their respective national central banks;

    Amendment

    35. Reiterates that the nominations to the ECB’s Executive Board should be merit and ability-based, with shortlists submitted to Parliament, and that men and women should have equal opportunities to serve as governors of their respective national central banks;

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40. Amendment 40Motion for a resolution · Paragraph 22 a (new)
    Amendment

    22a. Recalls that equal access to payment services is essential for participation in economic life; underlines that the increasing digitalisation of payments, if left exclusively to private and non-EU actors, risks creating new forms of exclusion for both users and merchants; stresses that an online and offline digital euro should contribute to safeguarding universal access to payments and broad acceptance by merchants across the EU, while fully respecting privacy and data protection standards;

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41. Amendment 41Motion for a resolution · Paragraph 23
    Current text

    23. Takes note of the ongoing discussions on the digital euro;

    Amendment

    23. Welcomes the ongoing discussions on the digital euro; underlines that, in a context of heightened geopolitical uncertainty and excessive dependence on non-EU payment infrastructures, the introduction of a digital euro, designed to complement cash and private banking services, is essential to strengthen EU monetary sovereignty, reduce fragmentation in retail payments and support the integrity and resilience of the single market;

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