Situation in Belarus, five years after the fraudulent presidential elections

Amendments tabled for the plenary sitting on this text, in their own numbering series. This is a different set from the committee amendments tracked elsewhere on AmendEU, and is not counted in any of the site’s amendment totals.

1. Amendment 1PPEJoint motion for a resolution · Paragraph 4
   Current text

   4. Reiterates that it does not recognise Aliaksandr Lukashenka as the legitimate president of Belarus and reaffirms its support for the Belarusian democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and for the democratic aspirations of the Belarusian people; calls for the EU and its Member States to work with non-EU countries to strengthen the policy of the non-recognition of Lukashenka as Belarus’s president; stresses the importance of sustained EU engagement with Belarusian democratic actors, ensuring that their efforts have political, financial and security support;

   Amendment

   4. Reiterates that it does not recognise Aliaksandr Lukashenka as the legitimate president of Belarus; recalls the widespread evidence and numerous testimonies indicating that Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was the legitimate winner of the 2020 presidential election, while the Lukashenka regime unlawfully clung to power and refused to acknowledge her victory; reaffirms its support for the Belarusian democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and for the democratic aspirations of the Belarusian people; calls for the EU and its Member States to work with non-EU countries to strengthen the policy of the non-recognition of Lukashenka as Belarus’s president; stresses the importance of sustained…

   Excerpt — full text in the official PDF.
   official amendment document ↗
2. Amendment 2The LeftJoint motion for a resolution · Paragraph 5 a (new)
   Amendment

   5a. Stresses that Belarus’s future must be determined by the will of its people, free from external pressure or interference; emphasises that Belarus’s sovereignty and political trajectory should reflect the aspirations of its citizens;

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3. Amendment 3The LeftJoint motion for a resolution · Paragraph 5 b (new)
   Amendment

   5b. Underlines that a peaceful, democratic, socially just Belarus is in the interest of stability in eastern Europe and the EU, and that isolation risks driving Belarus further into authoritarian dependency; calls for the EU to revise its sanctions policy to mitigate harm to ordinary citizens, while maintaining pressure on the regime; insists that any normalisation of relations between the EU and Belarus be conditional on credible progress in respect for human rights, the rule of law, press freedom, the civil society space, and justice for victims of repression;

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4. Amendment 4ESNJoint motion for a resolution · Paragraph 6 a (new)
   Amendment

   6a. Welcomes the release of 52 people, including 40 political prisoners, on 11 September 2025 as part of a deal between Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka and US President Donald Trump; notes the growing gap between pragmatic US engagement, easing sanctions in exchange for the release of prisoners, and the EU’s strict human rights approach; calls for the EU to consider limited diplomatic opening and dialogue in order to discuss the release of political prisoners and the end of Belarus’s hybrid warfare against EU Member States;

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5. Amendment 5ESNJoint motion for a resolution · Paragraph 12 a (new)
   Amendment

   12a. Is concerned about the transfer of Andrzej Poczobut, a Polish-Belarusian national who is active as a journalist, among other roles, and is a leading member of the Union of Poles in Belarus, from solitary confinement to a high-security cell in a Belarusian penal colony; calls for his immediate release;

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6. Amendment 6ESNJoint motion for a resolution · Paragraph 21 a (new)
   Amendment

   21a. Notes that several EU trade and financial sanctions have had adverse consequences, eroding the economic base of the pro-democracy middle class and benefiting people who are close to the regime; notes that the food export restrictions have had no impact on the regime’s financial resources; notes that the restrictions under the financial sanctions regime keep capital available for the Lukashenka regime, and that allowing capital outflow could reduce the regime’s financial resources; calls, therefore, for the EU to review its sanctions regime in order to limit economic hardship for the ordinary citizens of Belarus;

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7. Amendment 8RenewJoint motion for a resolution · Paragraph 24
   Current text

   24. Calls for the EU and the individual Member States to further formalise the representation of Belarusian democratic forces within the EU by supporting them in opening offices across European capitals and allowing them to issue provisional documents to exiled Belarusian citizens;

   Amendment

   24. Calls for the EU and the individual Member States to further formalise the representation of Belarusian democratic forces within the EU by supporting them in opening offices across European capitals in order to assist exiled Belarusian citizens in obtaining provisional documents;

   official amendment document ↗